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Abstract
An analytical result and an algorithm are derived for the probabil-
ity distribution of the one-dimensional cooperative Parrondo’s games.
We show that winning and the occurrence of the paradox depends on
the number of players. Analytical results are compared to the results
of the computer simulation and to the results based on the mean-field
approach.
1 Introduction
Devised as a pedagogical illustration of the Brownian ratchet mechanism,
Parrondo’s games are coin flipping games with an apparently paradoxical
property that alternating plays of two losing games produce a winning game.
In the original setup a player has some capital, which in game A is in-
creased by one with probability p and decreased by one with probability
1 − p [1],[2],[3]. Game B is more complicated and the rules are that the
probability of winning is p1 if the capital is multiple of M and if it is not,
the probability of winning is p2. A bias is introduced into probabilities such
that two games have a tendency to lose (capital is a decreasing function of
the number of runs). A third game, game A + B, may be constructed as a
random combination of games A and B, and this game is in the long run
winning (the capital is an increasing function of the number of runs). New
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types of Parrondo’s game have been recently introduced in which the feed-
back is introduced through spatial neighbor dependence [4], [5]. These games,
termed cooperative Parrondo’s games, rely on the state of player’s neighbors
depending whether a player has either lost or won the previous game. Each
of N players, arranged in a circle, owns a capital Ci(t), i = 1, . . . , N , which
evolves by combination of two games. Game A is the same as in the classi-
cal setup, namely the probability of winning and losing is p(A) and 1 − p(A)
respectively. Game B is different from its counterpart in the original setup
since it depends on the state of the neighbors to the left and to the right of
the player. It was shown that alternation of games A and B, which may be
losing or fair when played individually, leads to a winning outcome. In [4],
the evolution of probabilities in games B and C was studied using mean field
type equations since it was assumed that the corresponding exact equations
were too complicated to be obtained analytically. We derive here the exact
probability evolution equations analytically and show excellent agreement
with the results based on computer simulations. We also demonstrate that
the existence of the paradox depends on the number of players, when a set
of probabilities introduced in [4] is used. For arbitrary set of probabilities,
we establish the constraints that prevent the occurrence of the paradox when
games are played by three players. The same approach may be applied to
arbitrary number of players however with considerable increase in complexity
of expressions. The paper is organized as follows: Following a short presen-
tation of essential rules of the games in section 2, we derive the probability
transition matrix and the corresponding probability evolution equation in
section 3. Stationary probability distribution and constraints in the form of
inequalities for the paradox to occur are derived in section 4 and finally we
compare analytical results with computer simulation results and the mean
field approach of Toral [4] in section 5. We conclude with suggestions about
possible new directions and applications of this game.
2 Features of the Game
Each player may be in one of two states: state 0 (“loser”) or state 1 (“win-
ner”). The state of the whole ensemble of N players may be represented as a
binary string s = (s1, ...sN ), si ∈ (0, 1) of length N , or equivalently as state
s in decimal notation. We also assume periodic boundary conditions, i.e.
sN+1 = s1. To each state corresponds a vector, equivalent to a basis vector
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|s〉 in M = 2N dimensional state space SM
SM = {|s〉 |s = 0, 1, ...M − 1} . (1)
For example, state (011) is equivalent to state 3, and the corresponding
vector is |3〉 = [00010000]T , while state (111) is equivalent to state 7 and
the corresponding vector is |7〉 = [00000001]T . Game A is the same as in
the classical setup, while probabilities of winning in game B depend on the
present state of left and right neighbors, denoted as a pair (sk−1 sk+1), and
with player at position k are given by:
· p
(B)
0 when (sk−1 sk+1) = (00), in decimal notation 0,
· p
(B)
1 when (sk−1 sk+1) = (01), in decimal notation 1,
· p
(B)
2 when (sk−1 sk+1) = (10), in decimal notation 2,
· p
(B)
3 when (sk−1 sk+1) = (11), in decimal notation 3.
Winning or losing in any particular game leaves a player in state 1 (“win-
ner”) or 0 (“loser”) respectively, until he gets a random chance to play again.
Capital C(t) is a function of the ensemble that is incremented by 1 or decre-
mented by 1 if one of the players wins or loses respectively. Following a play
by one of the players, the state of the ensemble has changed from a state s(t)
at time t to a state s(t+1) at time t+1. If the probability that an ensemble
in state s(t) (or |s(t)〉 ) is pis(t), then the probability distribution p(t) at time
t is:
|pi(t)〉 =
∑M−1
s=0
pis(t) |s〉 , (2)
while the corresponding probability distribution evolution equation is
|pi(t+ 1)〉 = T |pi(t)〉 (3)
It was reported in [4] that the combination of losing games A and B, leads to
a winning result for the set of probabilities (p0 = 1, p1 = p2 = 0.16, p3 = 0.7).
Numerical simulations show that this set is not unique and in subsequent sec-
tions we discuss constraints that determine this paradoxical result, however
in further exposition we will adhere exclusively to this set.
3 Probability Transition Matrix
The analysis is performed via discrete time Markov chains (DTMCs) and
we first derive the probability transition matrix for game B. Since at each
3
moment of time only one player plays and therefore changes state, the change
may be represented by a Hamming distance between the initial (i) and the
final (f) state of player k is defined as:
dH =
∑N
k=1
|ik − fk| . (4)
Clearly, player may either remain in the same state as before the play (dHk =
|ik − fk| = 0) or change his state (d
H
k = |ik − fk| = 1). We will consider each
case separately.
Case 1: dH = 0
If the ensemble is in state s, then the k-th player is in state sk. State
s of the ensemble also defines the neighborhood of the k-th player, a pair
ηk = (sk−1, sk+1)which in turn determines the probability of winning. Since
the ensemble initially in state i may switch to state f = i in one of N different
ways as a result of one of the players switching from state ik to state fk = ik,
the probability of transition is in this case equal to the sum of probabilities
of independent events
Tfi = w(i→ f) =
1
N
∑N
k=1
w(ik, fk), (5)
where probabilities w depend on whether state fk is 1(winning) or 0 (losing),
and upon the probability of winning, i.e.
w(ik, fk) =
{
1− p
(B)
ηk fk = 0
p
(B)
ηk fk = 1
(6)
Case 1: dH = 1
In this case k-th player switches from state ik to state fk , (ik 6= fk ),
with probability
Tfi =
1
N
w(ik, fk). (7)
3.1 Probability transition matrix for N = 3
As an example we consider an ensemble of three players (N = 3) playing
game B, and let us assume that the ensemble is in state s = (011)= 3.
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Possible transitions and the corresponding probabilities are:
T33 = w(011→ 011) = w(3 → 3) =
1
3
[(1− p3) + p1 + p2]
T31 = w(011→ 001) = w(3 → 1) =
1
3
(1− p1)
T23 = w(011→ 010) = w(3 → 2) =
1
3
(1− p2)
T73 = w(011→ 111) = w(3 → 7) =
1
3
p3
(8)
Explicitly, probability T13 represents the probability that second player, in
state s2 = 1, switches to state f2 = 0. This probability is equal to the
product of the probability that it is this player’s turn to play i.e. 1/3, and
the probability that this player loses, i.e. switches to state f2 = 0. The
neighborhood of the second player, (s1 s3) = (0 1) = 1, determines the
choice p1. Similarly, transition T33 may take place when either one of the
three players switches to a same state, hence the corresponding probability
is the sum shown in the first expression of 8. Finally, using
p1i = 1− pi, i = 0, 1, 2, 3
Q1 = 1− p
3
+p
1
+p
2
and
Q2 = 2− p
2
−p
1
+p
0
the transition matrix for game B (N = 3) is:
T (B) =


3p1
0
p1
0
p1
0
0 p1
0
0 0 0
p0 Q2 0 p
1
1
0 p1
2
0 0
p0 0 Q2 p
1
2
0 0 p1
1
0
0 p
1
p
2
Q1 0 0 0 p
1
3
p0 0 0 0 Q2 p
1
1
p1
2
0
0 p
2
0 0 p
1
Q1 0 p
1
3
0 0 p
1
0 p
2
0 Q1 p
1
3
0 0 0 p
3
0 p
3
p
3
3p
3


(9)
Corresponding matrix for game A may be easily obtained by performing the
following replacement: p
(B)
η → p(A) for each p ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
Furthermore, we introduce a vector of the capital |C〉whose components
represent the capital generated by each ensemble state. Elements Cs of this
vector represent normalized capital generated by that specific state (equal
to the sum of all winning and losing individual states in a given ensemble
state). Naturally, player state 0 generates capital −1, while state 1 generates
capital +1. Explicitly,
Cs =
1
N
∑N
i=1
(−1)si+1, so that Cs ∈ [−1, 1] . (10)
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In other words, elements of |C〉 are average values of the capital generated
by each ensemble state separately. For example for N = 3, the vector of the
capital is:
|C〉 = (1/3) [−3 − 1 − 1 1 − 1 1 1 3]T . (11)
In the above expression the third vector element corresponding to the state
(010) =2 is equal to C2 = (1/3)((−1)+ (+1)+ (−1)) = (1/3)(−1). This also
implies that the ensemble switching from a state s(t) to a state s(t + 1) =
(010) = |2〉, under the assumption that such a transition is possible, gener-
ates average capital 〈C(t + 1)〉=〈C | 2〉 = −1/3. Furthermore, an ensemble
remaining in state |2〉 throughout its temporal evolution would in the aver-
age generate capital (−1/3) in each turn of the game. Hence the capital
generated by the ensemble is
〈C〉 = 〈C | pi〉 , (12)
where 〈C〉 denotes the average value of the generated capital. In order to
evaluate the probability for one of the games, either B or A+B to be winning,
it should be noted that:
Pwin + Plose = 1 (13)
Pwin − Plose = 〈C〉
where Pwin and Plose are probabilities of winning and losing in a certain game,
so that
Pwin = (1/2)(1 + 〈C〉). (14)
This expression implies that condition P
(B)
win < 1/2 , i.e. that game B is
losing, is equivalent to the condition
〈
C(B)
〉
< 0, and that P
(A+B)
win > 1/2, i.e.
that game A+B is winning, is equivalent to
〈
C(A+B)
〉
> 0.
4 Analysis of the Games
4.1 Equilibrium distribution
The equilibrium (stationary) state occurs when the probability distribution
remains invariant under the action of T , that is, |pi(t+ 1)〉 = T |pi(t)〉 =
|pi〉. In order to evaluate the probability distribution in this case, we need
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to solve (1 − T )pi = 0. For game A, for which there is a probability p for
a player to win (alternatively (1 − p) to lose), the stationary distribution is
easily obtained by setting p0 = p1 = p2 = p3 = p and reads
pi(A) = [(1− p)3, (1− p)2p, (1− p)2p, (1− p)p2, (15)
(1− p)2p, (1− p)p2, (1− p)p2, p3]T (16)
The probabilities in the above expression may also be readily obtained by
associating to each ensemble state, from 0 to 7 in decimal notation, corre-
sponding probabilities for each player. For game B the stationary distribu-
tion is
pi(B) = [
(1− p0)[2− (p1 + p2)](1− p3)α
p0p3(p1 + p2)
,
[2− (p1 + p2)](1− p3)α
p0p3(p1 + p2)
,(17)
[2 − (p1 + p2)](1− p3)α
p0p3(p1 + p2)
,
α(1− p3)
p3
,
[2− (p1 + p2)](1− p3)α
p0p3(p1 + p2)
α(1− p3)
p3
,
α(1− p3)
p3
, α]T ,
where
α =
1
[(1−p0)+3p3](1−p3)[2−(p1+p2)](1−p3)
p0p3(p1+p2)
− 3(1−p3)
p3
+ 1
. (18)
Substituting the set of probabilities given in [4], p0 = 1, p1 = p2 = 0.16, p3 =
0.7, in the expression for the stationary distribution for game B, we get
pi(B) = [0, .24901, .24901, .04743, .24901, .04743, .04743, .11067]T (19)
For the randomized game A + B, probabilities pi(i = 0, 1, 2, 3) for game B,
are replaced with the corresponding probabilities qi(i = 0, 1, 2, 3)given by:
qi = γp+ (1− γ)pi, (i = 0, 1, 2, 3). (20)
and where parameter γ represents the relative probability of playing game A,
where we have assumed the value of one half. The corresponding stationary
distribution for the randomized game, with p = 1/2, is
pi(A+B) = [.06006, .18019, .18019, .08875, .18019, .08875, .08875, .13312]T.
(21)
Expressions 19 and 21, although not leading to the paradoxical result illus-
trate the probabilities associated with each state in games B and A + B
respectively.
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4.2 Constraints of the games
The probability of winning using the stationary distribution is given by
pwinning = 〈pi | ρ〉 =
∑M−1
s=0
pisρs, (22)
where ρs is the winning probability in state pis. Components ρs of vector |ρ〉
may be defined using 14 or alternatively as,
ρs =
∑N
k=1
sk
N
, (23)
so that the probability that the ensemble generates a winning outcome when
switching to a state s = (s1, . . . , sN), is determined by the fraction of winning
players in the ensemble. The summation in the above expression should
actually be over the indices corresponding to the winning players, however
use of all indices is justified since states 0 do not contribute to the summation.
Since for the paradox to occur we must have P
(B)
win < 1/2 and P
(A+B)
win > 1/2
simultaneously, a simple calculation yields the following inequality
(p1 + p2)[1 +
1
2
(p0 − p3)] > 2[1−
1
4
(p0 + 3p3)]. (24)
We may also assume that probabilities p1 and p2 should be equal, so that
finally we get
1 > p1 >
1− 1
4
(p0 + 3p3)
1 + 1
2
(p0 − p3)
. (25)
If p0 = 1, and p3 = 0.7 are inserted in the above expression, the inequality
is not satisfied and there is no paradox, justifying the conclusion based on
numerical simulations that there is no paradox for games played by three
players when probabilities are those given by Toral in [4]. However, for the
same number of players and a set of probabilities, e.g. p0 = 0.09, p1 = p2 =
0.52 and p3 = 0.89, the paradox exists.
5 Results
All results in this section are based on probability values given in [4], namely
(p0 = 1, p1 = p2 = 0.16, p3 = 0.7, P
(A) = 0.499). First, in Fig. 1 we present
analytical results that show how paradox depends on the number of players
when N ≤ 12. Namely, in this range of N values paradox exists if N is
8
different from 3, 4, 7 or 8. Numerical simulations, shown in Fig. 2, indicate
that the paradox occurs if the number of players is greater than 8 and no
exceptions are noticed up to 1000 players. The mean-field equation for the
evolution of the common probability in game B
P (B)(t+ 1) = (1− P (B)(t))2p0 + P
(B)(t)(1− P (B)(t))(p1 + p2) + P
(B)(t)2p3,
(26)
in which each term reflects one of the four possibilities given in the definition
of the game, introduced in [4], naturally yields results irrespective of the
number of players.
As a comparative illustration of results based on all three approaches, we
show in Fig. 3 the average capital per turn as a function of the probability p3
of game B played by five players. Analytical and numerical simulation results
show perfect agreement while results based of the mean field equation show
very good agreement only in the (approximate) range 0.16 < p3 < 0.83.
For values of p3 below 0.16 the capital based on mean field calculations
shows that there is no stable solution of the iterative mean field equation.
Namely, mean field equation in this area switches to one of the two solutions
at each successive step of calculations while it deviates considerably from
the analytical and numerical results for p3 > 0.83. We emphasize that due
to the very nature of the mean-field approach this large discrepancy for low
and high values of p3 remains for arbitrary number of players. However the
dependence of the average capital as function of other probabilities, p0, p1
and p2 is considerably better, as presented in Fig. 4. for the case of p0 .
6 Conclusion
An algorithm for obtaining analytical expressions for the evolution of the
probabili-ties and constraints of the games is illustrated in the case of three
players. These results may prove to be of important use in applications
to social and economic models where exact results may be indispensable.
Usefulness of these games to social and economic models, and possibly in
biological applications, may be expanded by analyzing games played by all
players simultaneously that we introduce in the follow up paper [6]. Also, the
approach presented here may be useful in analysis of games based on spin
models. Moreover, we show that the mean-field approach, although useful
when large number of players is involved, may be quite inaccurate in certain
range of probabilities that define spatial neighbor dependence.
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3 Fig. 1. Averaged capital per turn as a function of the number of players
obtained using analytical expressions for the evolution of the probability dis-
tribution.. For 1 ≤ N ≤ 6 it is easy to distinguish winning and losing games,
however for N ≥ 7game B is barely losing and in order to accentuate that con-
clusion we use magnified scale for the capital. The spline fit is performed solely
for visualization purposes.
Fig.2. Numerically obtained averaged capital per turn (realization of the
games) as a function of the number of players (N). Capital is averaged over
1000 runs of the game, and over 100N turns in each run after the system entered
the stationary state.
Fig. 3. Mean-field approach results compared to the analytical and numer-
ical results for the average capital per turn as a function of p
(B)
3 for N = 5,
(p0 = 1, p1 = p2 = 0.16). Analytical and numerical results show excellent agree-
ment while mean-field results show considerable divergence for small and large
values of p
(B)
3 .
Fig. 4 Average capital per turn of the game as a function of p
(B)
0 . Due to
the large number of players only results based on the computer simulations are
compared to the mean-field results. The other probabilities p1 = p2 = 0.16,
p3 = 0.7 are kept fixed. The graph shows very good agreement.
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